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asserts that while working age population in emerging market countries will rise by one billion people by 2050, the same demographic group will shrink by 120 million in developed countries. In general, the underlying position was that emerging market and developing countries may have decoupled enough from the US such that these countries could continue on the path of economic growth even with a major slowdown in the US. this outcome. The slowdown has been related to specific sectoral developments in the US economy including corrections in the housing and manufacturing sectors, rather than to broadbased, common factors such as oil price or equity market developments that were often behind earlier downturns (IMF, April 2007) . This outcome may also have been related to the strengthening momentum of domestic demand in emerging markets, and other advanced economies (excluding the US), which made global growth seem more resilient at the time.
However, global reverberations emanating from the subprime crisis in the US seem to suggest otherwise. With the collapse of nearly all major investment banks in the US 8 , and sharp decline in both equity and commodity prices, anecdotal evidences suggest that the scope for economic spillovers may have increased significantly. While low-income countries had no direct exposure to subprime mortgages, there are still significant indirect effects through sharp declines in remittances, trade financing, foreign direct investment, and commodity prices.
Indeed, the crisis is projected to increase the financing requirements of low-income countries by as much as US$25 billion (IMF, 2009 ).
In the case of Nigeria, the global crisis has resulted in sharp declines in the value of oil exports, rapid depreciation of the exchange rate, and worsening investor sentiments in the banking sector. Given that over 90 percent of Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings and public sector revenue come from exports of crude oil, the fall in the price of crude oil (probably reflecting projected fall in global growth outlook) resulted in a rapid depreciation of the exchange rate and reversal of the trade balance from a usually comfortable surplus to a deficit.
More also, there was a plummeting of share prices and market capitalization of quoted companies as both foreign and local investors divested from the Nigerian stock exchange.
Remittances were also projected to fall by as much as 20 percent given the global slowdown.
In the context of this debate, this paper would examine the potential magnitude and transmission channels of spillovers in Nigeria. Given little empirical work (e.g. Dutse, 2008) on potential spillovers in Nigeria, I examine the relative effects of both external shocks in key trading partners as well as shocks captured by the purchasing power parity (PPP) implied exchange rate 9 on economic activity in Nigeria. In addition to identifying the magnitude of spillovers from each of these countries, I would also measure the relative importance, and contribution of three potential sources of spillovers to Nigeria, namely, trade linkages, financial channels, and commodity prices.
I will be building on two main papers, namely, Bayoumi and Swiston (2007), and Obiora (2009). While the former dealt with spillovers across selected industrial countries, the latter analyzed spillovers in the Baltics. Although the magnitude of the effect is still contentious, the literature on spillovers and international business cycles typically finds that countries with greater trade and financial linkages have more synchronized business cycles (see Imbs, 2004; Inklaar, Jong-a-pin and De Hann, 2005; Herrero and Ruiz, 2007; and Koopman and Azevedo, 2007) .
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section II, I discuss some stylized facts on trade and financial linkages of Nigeria with the rest of the world. A description of the data is presented in section III. Section IV uses vector autoregressive (VAR) models to assess the dynamics, and severity of shocks in trading partners as well as to competitiveness in Nigeria.
Following Bayoumi and Swiston (2007) , I estimate the contribution of spillovers from trade, commodity prices and finance in section V while section VI concludes the paper with some policy implications. and accounts for about 65 percent of total remittances in West Africa (Orozco, 2003a (Orozco, , 2003b .
II. TRADE AND FINANCIAL LINKAGES
This represents about 7 percent of the country's GDP (World Bank, 2007) . Given that the current global slowdown has resulted in massive job losses in developed countries, it expected that remittances to developing countries, including Nigeria, will decline sharply.
Given these linkages, business cycle correlations shows fairly similar turning points between Nigeria and her key trading partners ( Figure 6 ). for optimal choice in the unit root tests. These figures enable me to know whether or not to include an intercept, trend, or both in the unit root tests. Critical values 1/ *, **, and *** represent rejection of the unit root hypothesis at the 1percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
IV. METHODOLOGY
A combination of a base and an extended vector autoregression (VAR) model will be estimated to assess spillovers to Nigeria. VAR models are generally best suited for assessing spillovers given that we can obtain impulse responses and variance decomposition. Following
Cholesky decomposition, the variables in the VAR were ordered as follows: the growth rates of US real GDP, EU real GDP, Brazil real GDP, and Nigeria real GDP, as well as the PPP-implied (real) exchange rate. My selection of the ordering of the variables is based on the relative exogeneity of the variables.
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The analyses will also decompose the contributions of three potential channels of spillovers. In the subsequent subsections, I describe in more detail each of the models I will be estimating.
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To better assess Nigeria's responses, I extended the base VAR model by introducing oil price growth. Following Obiora (2009), I will improve on the presentations in Kanda (2007) and Swiston and Bayoumi (2008) by extending the base VAR model to include changes in oil prices given Nigeria's role as a major oil-exporting country. Changes in the price of oil may have opposing effects on the group of countries in this paper because increases in oil prices may have positive effects on Nigeria through increased revenue but may represent adverse supply shocks to Nigeria's oil-importing trading partners. The inclusion of oil price growth in the VAR, therefore, attempts to isolate these effects.
In the extended VAR model, I followed the same relative exogeneity assumptions used in the base VAR model. Given this, the ordering of the extended VAR is as follows: Oil price Growth, US GDP, EU GDP, Brazil GDP, Nigeria GDP and PPP-implied exchange rate.
V. RESULTS

A. Base VAR Model Results
A significant share of variation to Nigeria's GDP growth emanates from variation in GDP growth of her trading partners (Table 4) . The VAR models were estimated with two lags 14 for each variable in line with results presented in Table 3 . Over a 12-quarter horizon, variations in US GDP explains about a third of variations in Nigeria's GDP. While this result provides ample evidence against signs of developing and emerging markets decoupling from the US, it is important to stress that this finding may be country-specific and should be interpreted as such. Indeed, the results show that the share of variations in Nigeria's GDP attributable to changes in US GDP rises over the three year (12 quarters) horizon with a peak of over 50 percent by the end of the second year. The implication of this is that Nigeria is likely to continue to suffer from shocks from the US recession until about 2010. Variations to Brazil's GDP growth also contribute a significant share of variations to
Nigeria's GDP but the same is untrue for EU GDP. About 26 percent of variations to
Nigeria's GDP growth are attributable to changes in Brazil's GDP growth but the effect, in contrast to US GDP growth, falls over the 12-quarter horizon. The effect of Brazil's GDP changes peaks very fast in the second quarter at about 44 percent. Of the three leading trading partners, the EU contributes the least in explaining variations to Nigeria's GDP.
The results also show that exchange rate changes explain an insignificant share of variations to Nigeria's GDP. Given that PPP-implied exchange rate captures some form of the competitiveness of a country vis-à-vis its trading partners, this result would seem implausible.
However, one rationale for this might be that Nigeria's key export commodity, crude oil, does not depend on the vagaries of exchange rates. Besides, the manufacturing sector has suffered greatly from the Dutch Disease syndrome since the commercial exploration of oil began in the country.
The impulse response results confirm the findings that there are significant cross-country spillovers to Nigeria from major trading partners (Figure 8 ). For clarity of interpretation, I
normalized the impulse responses to present the percentage change in Nigeria's GDP in response to one percent shocks emanating from trading partners' GDP and the exchange rate.
The results confirm there are significant cross-country spillovers to Nigeria from all three main trading partners and the exchange rate. In all cases with trading partners, Nigeria's GDP growth responds with a contemporaneous increase in the first quarter following the shock, and settles on a higher and stable growth path around the end of 12-quarter horizon.
F igure 8. NIGE RIA : GD P Growth Responses to One P ercent S hocks from K ey Trading P artners and P P P -Implied E xchange Rate (1996 Rate ( -2008 S ourc e: A uthor's Calc ulation United S tates In particular, a one percentage point shock in US GDP growth exerts significant increase in Nigeria's GDP with a peak of about 1¼ percent in the 5 th quarter following the shock.
Similarly, Shocks from the EU and Brazil contemporaneously increases GDP growth in Nigeria with peak of about 1¾ and 1½ percents in the third and second quarters of the horizon, respectively.
In contrast to shocks from major trading partners, an appreciation of exchange rate contemporaneously depresses GDP growth in Nigeria. In the context of increases in the REER signifying appreciation of the exchange rate, and therefore, a loss of international competitiveness, shocks to the REER have adverse effects on Nigeria. However, the responses to shocks from the exchange rate hover around zero from the sixth quarter of the 12 quarter horizon.
B. Extended VAR Model Results
The introduction of oil price growth to the base VAR model does not change the results in a significant way (Table 6 ). In particular, the key variance decomposition results emanating from the extended VAR model include the following: Results from the impulse responses in the extended VAR model align with those from the base model. The results confirm there are indeed significant spillovers to Nigeria from trading partners, oil price growth and exchange rate shocks ( Figure 9 ). In summary, the following can be delineated from the results. model by introducing variables that proxy for these potential channels of spillovers as exogenous variables in a separate VAR (Obiora, 2009) . The difference between the response of GDP in the base and augmented VAR is interpreted as the size of the spillover attributable to that particular channel. For example, the difference between the response of Nigeria to the US GDP growth in the base VAR and the augmented VAR with financial conditions equals the impact of financial spillovers between the two countries. This difference is interpreted as the share of spillovers from the US that is transmitted through financial linkages. Thus, the contribution of a given channel to spillovers can be given as:
where is the contribution of a particular channel to spillovers, is the impulse responses from the base VAR while is the responses from augmented VAR in which a given channel, j, is introduced as an exogenous variable, rather than as an additional equation in the VAR In addition to being a widely-quoted short-term interest rate, the choice of the LIBOR is informed by its far-reaching influence on global lending decisions, and its effect on some of the world's most liquid and dynamic interest rate markets.
15 Given that these channels are quantified using this difference methodology, their sum is not constrained equal the estimates of aggregate spillovers coming from the base VAR. As Bayoumi and Swiston (2007) alludes, this "independent" approach to identifying the sources of spillovers provides an alternative estimate on the size of overall spillovers, which can be compared to the main results.
16 I have used this as a proxy for short term interest rates given that my inability to obtain an unbroken series of an anchor short term interest in Nigeria. On December 11, 2006 
VII. CONCLUSION AND LESSONS FOR POLICY
Did the world really decouple from the US? Using Nigeria as a case study, I have adopted a combination of a base and extended vector autoregression (VAR) models to provide a sufficiently unambiguous answer to this question. Results from both models debunk the "decoupling theory" in Nigeria's case and show that there are still significant cross-country spillovers from US (and other major trading partners) to Nigeria.
Indeed, both models show that the effect of a shock from the US rises over time in Nigeria with peaks around the end of the second year following the shock. I also found that of three potential channels of spillovers, namely trade, finance, and commodity prices, the most dominant channel of spillovers from the US to Nigeria are trade and commodity price linkages.
Hence, it is not surprising that the indirect effects of the current global crisis, which began in the US financial sector, has been quite significant, reflected in sharp fall in export earnings, trade financing, and depreciation of the exchange rate. Given these results, policymakers in Nigeria may have to pay attention to occurrences in the economies of key trading partners. It will also be beneficial to take cognizance of the fact that shocks from the US and the EU may have even larger effects over time as is clearly the case with the results from the variance decomposition in both models.
Two options for further studies emanate from this one. It might be interesting to evaluate the extent of spillovers from the US to regional trading blocs in developing and emerging market countries, and then to major emerging market countries individually. Findings from these
